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How to Achieve Public Participation in
Nuclear Waste Decisions: Public Relations or
Transparent Adversary Science
Judy Treichel*
Introduction
Commercial nuclear reactors in the United States have been
producing electricity and highly radioactive wastes for more than forty
years. Originally, reluctant utilities built reactors at the urging of
Congress, acting in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act.1 The
Act called for promotion of nuclear technology and also provided a
shield of secrecy allowing for extensive power to classify information.
Wiretapping and other surveillance techniques were allowable if nuclear
secrets or interference with nuclear programs were involved. 2 During
this time the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) provided films and
comic books, and gave speeches in a public relations campaign designed
to convince the public, both in the U.S. and abroad, that the same
technology that created the atomic bomb could be used to vastly
improve the quality of life. Throughout the period of hard sell and
promotion of nuclear power, the issue of waste management and
disposal was either ignored or assurances were given that there was no
problem. Since the 1950s, science, business and government have
claimed that solutions are available and that nuclear waste disposal is a
political problem, not a technical challenge.
In 1975, the AEC was transformed into two new federal agencies:
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), charged with regulating
the civilian nuclear industry, and the Energy Research and
* Ms. Treichel is a co-founder of the Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force and has been the
Executive Director for twelve years. She is a long-time public advocate working for publicly
acceptable federal nuclear waste policies. Funded through public donations and foundation
grants, the Task Force promotes citizen involvement in federal decision making and provides
public education and information about the proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at
Yucca Mountain. E-mail: judyt/@anv.net.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2011.
2 See Rosalie Bertell, No Immediate Danger? Prognosis for a Radioactive Earth (1985).
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Development Administration (ERDA) which, two years later, became
the Department of Energy (DOE). Although the AEC ceased to exist
more than twenty years ago, the Atomic Energy Act that created it is
still very much alive.
During the 1960s and 1970s, government attempts were made to
site and build a repository. When no waste facilities appeared and
irradiated fuel began to fill the cooling pools at the commercial nuclear
reactor sites, Congress, in the late 1970s, decided to create legislation
that would provide for a fair siting process and also ensure that a
repository would be built. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
provided a national screening process for the selection of first and
second repository sites. 3 Making no effort to find out what would be
a publicly acceptable plan, Congress simply decided that if a first site
was chosen in the West, with limited capacity so as to assure that there
would be a second site in the East, citizens would endorse the plan.
Strong citizen opposition began almost immediately at every site under
consideration and when it became a political nightmare, particularly for
Congressional representatives seeking reelection, the Act was amended.
In both the original Act and the Amendments Act of 1987, the heavy
hand of the Atomic Energy Act was evident. 4 The federal
government claimed complete jurisdiction of the regulation of the
waste, and the federal laws allowed for the preemption of state laws.
This decision to regulate nuclear waste was justified on the ground
Congress had already occupied the entire field of "nuclear safety
5
concerns" when it passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
The Amendments Act named Yucca Mountain as the sole site to be
studied and placed all authority and decision making in the hands of
the DOE and NRC. The State of Nevada was given the right to issue a
"notice of disapproval" if or when the site was officially selected but the
courts have determined that even that cannot be done until all site
characterization is completed and the site has been recommended by
the President. Almost certainly the issuance of the notice will be an
exercise in futility because it can be overridden by Congress. The Act
3
4

42 U.S.C. § 10101.
See id; 42 U.S.C. § 10172.

5 See Douglas Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository Studies in Risk and Uncertainty (1995).
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also called for the State to be provided funds for oversight and public
information. However, first the DOE chose to withhold the money and
then Congress refused to appropriate such funds, believing or fearing
that Nevada would be able to thwart the federal program.
When Nevada officials and citizens expressed outrage at the law
and its implications, DOE attempted to mollify them by creating
"Cpublic participation plans." During the last twelve years a whole series
of such plans has been drafted but none ever made it to final form.
There have been calls for other strategies to be employed as well, in
hopes of getting the people of the state to either change their minds or
accept their fate. Little or no effort has been made to determine why
the opposition is so entrenched and all suggestions of negotiated
benefits are rejected out of hand.
The Atomic History of the Western U.S.
Nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site began in 1951,
and, although there have been some temporary interruptions, it
continues today as sub-critical testing. Until 1963 the bombs were
exploded in the atmosphere, either above or at the desert surface. Like
the rest of the atomic weapons program, this activity would have been
shrouded in secrecy, but the incredible flash of the explosions and the
rising mushroom clouds that drifted away from the test site made
concealment of the tests impossible. What could be, and was, concealed
was the health and environmental danger of those tests which was well
known at the time.
Longtime residents of Nevada, Utah and Arizona remember the
tests and the oft repeated assurance - "there is no danger." Northeast
from Las Vegas and the Nevada Test Site are farming and ranching
communities and some small towns near mines where older residents
can recall the various tests and the fallout that caused illness and
damage to themselves and their animals. Many books have been written
and the stories and pictures in them are similar in terms of what
happened to those living and working downwind. Here is an example
from the book, Fallout.6 It tells about a test shot, code named
Harry, that was part of one testing series in 1953. After the shot, as the
radioactive cloud floated to the northeast, vehicles were stopped along
6

See P. Fradkin, Fallout: An American Nuclear Tragedy (1989).
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the highway so that fallout particles could be washed off. The deputy
sheriff who made the traffic stop was on horseback. The name of his
horse was Fallout because of the radiation burns on its back. The
deputy and other local residents noticed that the radiation monitoring
device of an AEC official was reading off the scale, but the official
assured them that everything was all right. The regulation for offsite
radiation at that time was 3.9 rems over a period of thirteen weeks. But
it was a general guideline that could be exceeded if AEC personnel
7
decided it was necessary to conduct more tests.
People who were working outside on the day of test shot Harry, as
most farmers and ranchers were, experienced burns on their exposed
skin. Others downwind of the test told of other conditions such as
headaches, fever, thirst, dizziness, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, hair loss,
discoloration of fingernails and hemorrhaging. Some people suffered
serious and painful symptoms while others had no reaction at all. The
sorts of ailments that some people were experiencing indicate that the
8
levels were tens to hundreds of times higher than the allowable dose.
The people who were subjected to false assurances and who received
virtually unrestricted radiation doses during atmospheric testing were
the first Americans to experience government risk assessment. The
radiation guideline in effect at that time was decided by an AEC
scientist, George Dunning, who claimed later in a court case that, "it
was a matter of balancing benefits against risks." 9
During this time in our history, still in the memories of people who
experienced it first hand, the predecessors to the current DOE did not
just fail to warn the people who would suffer the effects of radiation
exposure; they embarked on deceitful, pretentious public relations
campaigns. A good example was one of the films that was produced by
the AEC to be shown in areas where the residents had begun to
demand that the bomb tests be stopped. The Commission's director of
public information said, "The film was designed as part of the
education program to dispel the unwarranted worry among residents in
Nevada and adjoining states about hazards from tests. This worry was
7
8

See id.
See id.

9

Id.
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threatening continued use of the test site." In the film, the narrator
states, "The Atomic Energy Commission doesn't take chances on
10
safety."
Eventually there were lawsuits filed by residents, uranium miners,
veterans, ranchers and farmers for illnesses, deaths and loss of livestock.
Although a lower court ruled favorably for some of the plaintiffs, those
cases were overturned and eventually the verdict for all was unfavorable
- it was the opinion of the appeals court that the government had
sovereign immunity, and although the cancer deaths were unfortunate,
the court decided that it was not the place of the judicial branch to
question the decisions of the federal government.
This is not to say that the disposal of high-level nuclear waste at
Yucca Mountain would pose the same threat that atmospheric weapons
testing created for people living nearby or downwind. It is told to point
out that the people and state being targeted to host the nation's highlevel nuclear waste repository have been victimized before. They have
already heard similar assurances that were untrue and have been
subjected to "education" that the old AEC believed would instill trust
in those who were then referred to as "the risk population."
The Downwinders who were personally deceived by the Atomic
Energy Commission during atmospheric weapons testing did not tell
their stories to gain notoriety. Most of the victims, living closest to the
test site were private, patriotic people whose feelings can be summed up
by a statement made in 1992 by Elizabeth Wright of St. George, Utah:
"We're willing to look to the future and say, okay, it happened, but it
11
must never happen again."
Public Relations and the Repository Program
When the federal government sought a place for weapons testing
within the continental U.S. in 1949, experts sought a place that was
remote, sparsely populated meteorologically sound, and preferably
already under federal jurisdiction. They found such a setting in
southern Nevada, northwest of Las Vegas. Now, five decades later, the
federal government once again needs a place which is remote, secure,
and environmentally appropriate for the housing of another, perhaps
10

Id.

1

Carole Gallagher, American Ground Zero: The Secret Nuclear War (1993).
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even more controversial, nuclear project. And again Washington has
chosen Nevada. 12
When Yucca Mountain was singled out as the sole site to be studied
for a national repository, Nevadans were told that if the site was
unsuitable, it could never be recommended or licensed. Residents were
assured that with the existing Environmental Protection Agency
radiation standard, NRC licensing rules, and DOE siting guidelines
with qualifying and disqualifying conditions, that the mountain could
never become a repository without clear proof of its ability to contain
and isolate the waste. But regardless of the promises from the DOE
representatives, skeptical public audiences told federal officials about
Nevada's experience during the days of weapons testing and that they
did not believe that the site would be eliminated from consideration
once a lot of money had been spent and there were no alternative sites
available.
More than a decade later, Nevadans believe that their fears have
been confirmed. All of the rules and regulations governing the selection
and licensing of a repository are in the process of change and in fact,
officials do say now, although not on the record, that this is the only
site and it is essential to have a repository. Representatives of the
commercial nuclear industry are more outspoken. They publicly say
that a repository at Yucca Mountain is inevitable and that the only
intelligent thing for people to do is to accept the fact that it will be built
and negotiate for benefits.
Apparently naivete or miscalculation led both the government and
nuclear industry to believe that the public would accept the nuclear
waste program because so-called experts claimed that it would be safe,
or a crisis made it necessary, and there was no other choice. Nevadans
have been treated much like stubborn children. In efforts to reason with
their children, parents often explain why a decision has been made. If
the youngster still refuses to accept it, ultimately the parent just decides
that the argument is over. Similarly, the public has repeatedly argued
with DOE about the lack of ability of Yucca Mountain to isolate waste
for the long term. The discussion often ends with DOE, concluding
12 See A. Costandina Titus, Battle Born Federal-State Conflict in Nevada During the
Twentieth Century (1989).
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that "we have to do something." This heavy handed, paternalistic,
"father knows best" style has its roots in the Atomic Energy Act and its
directive to promote nuclear power. But Nevadans are not children and
their experiences during the years of atomic weapons testing have
destroyed all of the sort of trust in government and technology that
existed in the 1940s and 1950s. This is not unique to Nevada.
Americans generally have become increasingly disenchanted with
government and suspicious of technology.
Throughout the life of the U.S. high-level nuclear waste program,
problems have been eliminated with quick fix solutions. When it
appeared that all possible repository sites would fail because of political
opposition, Congress enacted a legislative fix and changed the law to
single out Nevada. After years of assurances to Nevadans that Yucca
Mountain would have to meet all requirements, when evidence surfaced
suggesting that Yucca Mountain would not meet existing standards and
regulations for the isolation of waste, technological fixes came about.
People were told that engineering could provide protection for
thousands of years and "the otherwise good site" need not be
disqualified. Each new public participation plan drafted by the DOE
appeared to citizens to be a "knowledge fix." 13
Almost certainly the opposition to the Yucca Mountain repository
program cannot be overcome. Public opinion against the facility is
growing and probably will continue to do so. The government and
nuclear industry have nothing to offer the citizens of Nevada that
would serve as an inducement to accept an unwanted project. The first
question that must be answered is: How much does public acceptance
matter? If the opposition of Nevadans and others is unimportant, then
the Congress can take the advice given by Luther Carter in 1993:
Congress could break up the political dynamic that has
favored all-out state resistance by declaring unequivocally
that the Nevada Test Site is to become the center for
nuclear storage and by directing that a spent-fuel surface
storage be built and ready to operate [in five years]. 14
13 Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste Citizens' Views of Repository Siting (Riley Dunlap,
Michael Kraft, & Eugene Rosa eds., 1993).
14 Luther Carter, Ending the Gridlock on Nuclear Waste Storage Issues in Science and
Technology Resources for the Future (1993).
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Following that advice will lead to costly, long term litigation, public
anger and, most likely, civil disobedience actions similar to those
experienced in Germany when attempts were made to transport waste.
If public acceptance is considered necessary, as it is by many
countries, then the Yucca Mountain program and efforts to site a
"temporary" storage facility at the Nevada Test Site must stop. No
amount of education, transparency, or risk communication will achieve
the goal of public support for either program. But the program should
not simply stop and be forgotten until a new policy is conceived. Waste
exists; it is dangerous material needing good, long-term storage and
management techniques, and there are important lessons that can be
learned from the experiences of the last twenty years of this program.
Risk Assessment, Communication and Transparency
Risk assessment is not a new concept. It is a routine part of the
decision process for many projects where the cost is substantial and
success is not assured. A good example might be the building of an
airport to serve a city. First, the residents would have to want to have
available airplane transportation. The citizens' representative would
decide, with a builder, where the facility would be located and what
restrictions would be required. The builder would then decide if the
project the community wanted could be successfully built, what time
would be necessary and how much it would cost. The project would
never be contemplated if a large majority of the people did not want
the airport. It would also never start if the builder thought that the
success of the project was not certain or if the cost was more than the
community could afford. Because the people wanted the project, the
elected officials and builder would not have to go to great lengths to
gain trust and confidence or to make the project transparent. However,
if this town valued isolation and quiet, and had no desire to travel by
plane, it would be virtually impossible to convince them to build or
even accept an airport. This is more or less the situation with a Nevada
high-level nuclear waste facility.
Perhaps if the history was different and the State had no firm
opinion about the project, the prospects might be different. There
might be opportunities for proponents of the program to make a sales
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pitch, but honest risk communication and transparency cannot be
added to an unpopular project like seasoning to a plate of food. Both
must have taken place before the start of the program. Public interest
groups and knowledgeable, concerned citizens must first agree with the
government or the policy's promoters that it is necessary and
appropriate. To be deemed necessary it must be obvious that not taking
action is costly or risky. Appropriateness comes from evidence that the
proposed action is the best that can be done and is a solution or makes
the problem significantly better. For Nevadans and many citizens elsewhere, the Yucca Mountain project does not pass either of these tests.
Options for the Future
The first step in a new program should be a broad public discussion
of all the issues that citizens believe are involved or relevant. Currently,
public audiences are never allowed to question the need or desirability
of future commercial nuclear power in discussions about waste disposal.
This is unfair because the government and nuclear industry
representatives usually explain the value of nuclear power when
justifying the need for a national repository or centralized storage
facility.
There must also be agreement on what the problem is before
solutions are determined. The U.S. nuclear waste problem is viewed
very differently by government, industry and the public. Often nuclear
industry representatives consider risk in monetary terms. The DOE is
concerned about risks associated with missing schedule deadlines.
Similarly, benefits are defined by the bureaucratic parties very
differently than they are by the public. The importance and impact of
cost is another issue that is considered differently by all parties. A good
example is the often heard rationale that the problem must be solved by
this generation and not left to our grandchildren. That statement is
nothing more than a poor excuse for speeding up the project. The
public knows that a program that requires a minimum of fifty years to
complete will undoubtedly be left to the grandchildren. They also have
doubts about whether the current program is a solution or a far more
dangerous problem for their descendants. Most of these discussions also
develop serious arguments about semantics. People become frustrated
and angry when they are told that health effects are latent fatal cancers
11 Risk- Health, Safety & Environment 221 [Summer 2000]

and all other radiation-induced health conditions are excluded from
consideration. These discussion restrictions are an affront to people's
ethics and value systems.
Another issue that is considered "off the table" is reexamination of
alternative disposal or waste management technologies. A new program
must explore whether or not there is national agreement that deep
geologic disposal is the best or only option. Such an appraisal has two
key requirements. First, the values of the general public must be
reflected in whatever decisions are made. Second, the process must last
15
long enough to foster a true consensus.
The public should have the ability to hire qualified, independent
scientists and experts. After the history of secrecy that has permeated
atomic activities, citizens are skeptical of information that comes from
those who are paid by, or associated with, the government or the
nuclear industry. Officials and investigators at Yucca Mountain have
been accused of practicing advocacy science. People suspect that project
scientists have either chosen, or have been directed, to primarily look
for site conditions or attributes that are favorable. Whether or not the
charge is warranted, public trust and confidence will be greatly
increased if their interests are protected by their own adversary
scientists.
Once agreement has been reached on a national policy, there will
likely be a local component to the program. If a site or sites are to be
chosen for nuclear waste management or disposal facilities, it should be
done through a volunteer process. A key element to finding a
community to host any project could well be the ability of the residents
to have their own trusted experts and advisors. A March 1999 British
House of Lords report noted that "surveys of public opinion about
environmental issues show that the public in Britain has less trust in
government scientists than in those working for environmental
organizations."1 6 Clearly there has been a failure in federal
government risk communication in the U.K. similar to that in the U.S.
because the next section of the report states: "In general, the public has
15 See Douglas Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository Studies in Risk and Uncertainty (1995).
16 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Third Report, Ch. 5, Public
Acceptability, Sec. 13, 1999.
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a propensity to believe statements from environmental organizations
that there are significant risks and to disbelieve Government statements
17
that risks are negligible."
And finally, it must be allowable to take no action. It is not true
that "we have to do something." It is also not fair for people who
dissent to be required to "have a better answer." In fact, their
unwillingness to burden their grandchildren with possibly a far greater,
more dangerous situation very well might be "a better answer." The
National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council Committee
on Risk Characterization advises, "Even if participation does not
increase support for a decision, it may clear up misunderstandings
about the nature of a controversy and the views of various participants.
And it may contribute generally to building trust in the process, with
18
benefits for dealing with similar issues in the future."

17 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Third Report, Ch. 5, Public
Acceptability, Sec. 14, 1999.
18 Committee on Risk Characterization, Understanding Risk Informing Decisions in a
Democratic Society (Paul Stern & Harvey Fineberg eds., 1996).
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